Joy

Joy is one of the variety of positive emotions or affective states that also include happiness, contentment, pleasure, excitement, satisfaction, gladness, ecstasy, and others. According to Bagozzi (1999), the English language has about 40 words that describe states that are variants of happiness.

The word joy is sometimes used generally to describe a pleasant emotional or affective state. However, psychologists have attempted to distinguish the variety of positive states in an effort to provide clear descriptions of each individual state. The states can be categorized as other-directed (interpersonal) or self-directed (intrapersonal; DeRivera & Grinks, 1986). Love is an example of an other-directd state, whereas most of the positive emotion terms, including joy, refer to self-directed states. Emotions and affective states may also be distinguished by degree of arousal (e.g., Russell, 1980). Some positive states involve high arousal, such as ecstasy, and others involve low arousal, such as tranguility or contentment. Joy falls in between these extremes, with moderate arousal. Another way to understand affective experience is a reaction to an immediate event or whether it describes an individual’s typical or customary way of feeling (the latter may indicate a personality trait). Applying this distinction, joy is usually used to mean a positive emotional experience that occurs as a reaction to a particular event, whereas according to some emotion researchers (e.g., Kalat & Shiota, 2007), the term happiness is more appropriate for an affective state that one has more consistently; thus some people can be said to have happy personalities.

Schumm (1999) distinguishes between four positive emotional states: pleasure, satisfaction, happiness, and joy. The main difference between the four states has to do with what causes the state. Pleasure is usually associated with the occurrence of something tangible such as eating good food, using a drug, or finindg a $100 bill on the street. The cause of pleasure is not necessarily related to anything that the individual experiencing the pleasure has achieved or earned (although it can be). The feeling of pleasure is short-lived; it tends to go away soon after the evetn that caused it. Satisfaction is more complex than pleasure because it involves thinking. Someone experiencing satisfaction when he achieves what he has set out to achiveve or what he feels he deserves. For instance, a person may feel satisfaction when he has won an award that he thougth he deserved for the poem that he wrote. Since satisfaction involves thinking (cognition), it may be either fairly easy or fairly difficult for a particular individual to experience it; some people may hold very high standards for feeling satisfaction, for instance, by requiring high absolute performance or requiring oneself to continually achieve more and more over time or requiring oneself to be better than all competitors. Happiness is less cognitive and more emotional than satisfaction; Shumm (1999) and others have described happiness as the emotional aspect of a general sense of well-being, whereas satisfaction is the cognitive aspect. Additionally, happiness is often described as being largely derived from the quality of one’s interpersonal relationships with friends and family. Joy is usually associated with transcendent experiences. Most often, these experiences are religious or spiritual or the result of involvement in meaningful work. Csikszentmihalyi (1997) has described the feeling of “flow,” intense concentration and full involvement, that occurs when an individual is engaged in much-loved work and is making nearly full use of his capabilities. A significant component of flow is joy.

  • Bagozzi, R.P. (1999). Happiness. In D. Levinson, J.J. Ponzetti, & P.F. Jorgensen (Eds.), Encyclopedia of human emotions (2nd ed. pp. 317 – 324). New York: Macmillan Reference USA.
  • Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). Finding flow: The psychology of engagement with everyday life. New York: Basic Books.
  • de Rivera, J., & Grinkis, C. (1986). Emotions as social relationships. Motivation and Emotion, 10, 351 – 369.
  • Kalat, J.W., & Shiota, M.N. (2007). Emotion. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
  • Russell, J.A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1161 – 1178.
  • Schumm, W.R. (1999). Satisfaction. In D. Levinson, J.J. Ponzetti, & P.F. Jorgensen (Eds.), Encyclopedia of human emotions (2nd ed., pp. 583 – 590). New York: Macmillan Reference USA.
  • Since cognitive science Opens in new window has taken on board this commonsense view of the mind, an important question is how such a relationship to a proposition can be implemented.

    The representation theory of mind (RTM; Field, 1978; Fodor, 1978) assumes that a propositional attitude consists in holding a representation of the proposition and that this representation plays a certain functional role in the economy of mental states. This can be best illustrated with the two core concepts: belief and desire.

    These are core concepts, since knowing what someone believes (thinks) to be the case (e.g., Max thinking the chocolate is in the cupboard and thinking that going there will get the chocolate into his possession) and what that person desires (wants) (e.g., Max wanting the chocolate to be in his possession) allows us to make a behavioral prediction that Max will approach the cupboard. This kind of inference is known since Aristotle as the practical syllogism.

    Searle (1983, after Anscombe, 1957) points out that these two states are mirror images in terms of causal direction and direction of fit. The function of a belief is to be caused by reality and the believed proposition should match reality.

    For instance, the chocolate being in the cupboard should be responsible for Max’s believing that the chocolate is in the cupboard (world to mind causation) and the proposition “the chocolate is in the cupboard” should thus match the relevant state of affairs in the world (mind should fit world).

    The function of desire (want) is to cause a change in the world (mind to world causation) so that the world conforms to the desired proposition (world should fit mind)—for example, if Max wants the chocolate to be in the cupboard, then this desire should cause action leading to a change of the chocolate’s location such that it conforms to what Max desires.

    This trivial-sounding example does highlight the important distinctions.

    Three Important Distinctions

    1. First vs. Third Person

    One important distinction is between first-person and third-person attribution of mental states. A third-person attribution is an attribution to another person and a first-person attribution is one to myself.

    For instance, if Max erroneously believes that the chocolate is still in the cupboard (because he didn’t see that it was unexpectedly put into the drawer), then a third-person observer will attribute a false belief to Max. In contrast, Max himself will make a first-person attribution of knowledge to himself.

    The observer can capture this difference between her own and Max’s subjective view by the second-order attribution that Max thinks he knows where the chocolate is. This is useful to keep in mind when it comes to false memories. Since a memory can only be a recollection of something that actually occurred, a false memory is not a memory by third-person attribution, although it is by first-person attribution.

    1. Sense and Reference

    A related second point has to do with Frege’s (1892/1960) distinction between sense and reference. Since mental states involve representations, they connect us to objects and events in the real (or a possible) world.

    Famously, Oedipus knew and married Iocaste (referent: a particular person), but he did not know or marry her as his mother but as an unrelated queen (sense: how Iocaste was presented to Oedipus’ mind).

    Thus, in third-person parlance we can say that Oedipus married his mother if we use the expression “his mother” to pick out (refer to) the individual whom he married without implying that he knew Iocaste under that description. In first-person description of the event Oedipus would not have used the descriptor “my mother.”

    These distinctions are useful to keep in mind when discussing infants’ ability to remember particular events: Whenever a memory trace of a unique event can be demonstrated then one can conclude (in first-person parlance) as a particular event—that is, that the infant makes cognitive distinctions that represent that event as a particular event.

    1. Having vs. Representing a Mental State

    The third important distinction is that between being in a mental state (or having an attitude) and representing that mental state.

    For understanding or knowing that a person is in a mental state, or to reflect on one’s own mental states, one has to be able to represent that state. In order to be able to represent a state, one needs a concept of that state—that is, a rich enough theory of mind.

    The study of how children acquire the requisite theory of mind is therefore essential for our understanding of how children come to understand memory. Furthermore, since some memorial states are reflective or self-referential, children need a theory of mind for being in such states or having such memories.

    Why We Need a Theory of Mind for Memory

    We probably do not need a theory of mind for implicit (nondeclarative Opens in new window) memory, but for explicit (declarative Opens in new window) memory we do, since “explicit memory is revealed when performance on a task requires conscious recollection of previous experiences.” (Schacter, 1987).

    To be conscious of a fact one requires to be also aware of the state with which one beholds that fact. The higher-order-thought theories of consciousness make this their core claim (Armstrong, 1980; Rosenthal, 1986).

    For instance, if one sees a state of affairs X (e.g., that the chocolate is in the cupboard), then this seeing is a first-order mental state (attitude).

    To be conscious of this state of affairs means, according to theory, that one entertains a second-order thought about the seeing—that is, the second-order thought represents the first-order seeing.

    A weaker version does not require that one has to entertain the second-order thought, but only that one has to have the potential for having the second-order thought (Carruthers, 1996). That some such condition must be true can be seen from the following consideration:

    “Could it ever be that I can genuinely claim that I am consciously aware of the chocolate being in the cupboard, but claim ignorance of the first-order mental state by which I behold this state of affairs—that is, by claiming that I have no clue as to whether I see, or just think of, or want the chocolate being in the cupboard?”

    The important point of these conceptual analyses is that to be conscious of some fact requires some minimal concept of knowledge or of some perceptual state like seeing.

    Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence when children understand a minimal state of this sort. There is some evidence of understanding (mother’s) emotional reactions and seeing (direction of gaze) in the first year of life (see Perner, 1991, chap. 6; Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, for summaries and discussion of problems of interpretation).

    There is also some recent evidence that between 8 and 12 months children might be inferring people’s intentions to grasp an object from where that person looks (Spelke, Philips, & Woodward, 1995) and even between 5 to 9 months from how a person touches an object (seemingly intentional or accidentally).

    And by 18 months (where children’s understanding of mental phenomena seems to flourish in general) children imitate people’s intended actions even when they observe a failed attempt (Meltzoff, 1955a) and they understand differences in preferences (e.g., that someone else can prefer cauliflower over biscuits, Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997).

    Evidence that children distinguish their knowledge from ignorance is available at a relatively late age. Povinelli, Perilloux, and Bierschwale (1993) asked children to look for a sticker under one of three cups.

    Children were first trained to look under the cup at which the experimenter had pointed. After some training even the youngest were able to do this.

    When asked to look without the experimenter pointing, an interesting developmental difference emerged. Children older than 2 years and 4 months acted without hesitation when they knew which the cup the sticker was under, but hesitated noticeably when—in the absence of the experimenter’s poining—they had to guess where it was.

    Interestingly this is also the age at which children start using the phrase “I don’t know” (Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983). In contrast, children younger than that showed no comparable difference in reaction time. This may indicate that young 2-year-olds do not yet reflect on what they do and do not know.

    So, theory of mind research is not yet able to give a guideline for when infants might develop explicit, conscious memories. Memory development may help out on this point.

    Meltzoff (1985, 1995b) demonstrated that 14-month-old infants can reenact a past event (e.g., they imitate the experimenter leaning forward to touch a panel with forehead so that panel lights up) after several months. Recently this has been demonstrated in 11-month-olds with a delay of 3 months.

    Since this is achieved from a brief observational period and does not require prolonged learning, and since patients with amnesia cannot do this (McDonough, Mandler, KcKee, & Squire, 1995), it is tempting to conclude that such enactment demonstrates explicit, conscious memory.

    One should, though, keep in mind that delayed imitation that is based on a single event (third-person view) is not to be equated with a memory (knowledge) of that event as a single, past event (first-person view).

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      Adapted from: The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Authored by ENDEL TULVING (ED.), Fergus I. M. Craik