Theory of Mind

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer the emotional state, beliefs, desires, or intentions of others from nonverbal signals (e.g., facial expressions or body language) or linguistic cues (prosody).

This awareness of another’s perspective is related to social cognitionOpens in new window which is found in normally developing humans, other primates (e.g., chimpanzees and orangutans; Call & Tomasello, 1998), and some other animals (e.g., dogs; Horowitz, 2009).

Sometimes referred to as mind-blindness, ToM deficits describe an inability to take another person’s perspective. Individuals with a ToM deficit may have difficulty determining other’s intentions, understanding how their own behavior affects other people, or have a difficult time with social reciprocity.

Social reciprocity is involved in activities such as taking turns when playing games or engaging in conversation.

ToM research burgeoned after the 1978 publication of an article by American psychologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff (“Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?”). Both an understanding of attention in others and awareness of others’ intentions are precursors to development of ToM.

Normally developing human infants usually understand attention in others by seven to nine months of age. An understanding of others’ intentions or goals may also be a precursor to ToM; this understanding has been observed in children ages two and three years (Call & Tomasello, 1998).

EmpathyOpens in new window is a concept related to ToM. It may be necessary to understand that other people have their own thoughts, emotions, and intentions before being able to put oneself in another person’s shoes. ToM deficits are a key characteristic of individuals with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD)Opens in new window, including Asperger’s syndromeOpens in new window. However, this does not mean that people with ASD do not experience emotions, including empathy. ToM deficits have also been observed in individuals with schizophrenia (Philips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003) and have been posited in some cases of bipolar disorder and dementia (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006).

There are several types of tasks or tests to determine whether an individual has ToM. In the false-belief task, test subjects are told a story involving two characters.

In an example of the false-belief story, there are two children in a room (Bob and Anne), two containers (a box and a basket), and a marble. Bob places the marble in the basket, then leaves the room. While Bob is gone, Anne moves the marble from the basket to the box. Bob returns. The examiner asks the test subject where Bob will look for the marble.

The test subject passes the task if s/he says that Bob will look in the basket for the marble. Someone without this ability might answer incorrectly that Bob will look for the marble in the box (where the marble has actually been moved).

To pass the false-belief task, an individual needs to understand that Bob does not know about the marble being moved from the basket to the box. The appearance-reality task test subjects are shown a box that has a label (for example) with a picture of candies.

The test subject is asked what he or she thinks is in the box. The test subject answers correctly, “candies.” Then the examiner opens the box and shows that it actually contains pencils. The experimenter closes the box and asks the test subject what another person, who has not been shown the true contents, will think is in the box (the correct answer is “candies”).

A drawback with many ToM tests is that it is difficult to distinguish between language abilities, desire for social interaction, and ToM. There is a strong relationship between the development of language abilities and ToM abilities.

It has been found that Deaf children—even those with language delays (sign language or oral language)—develop ToM abilities similar to those of hearing children. This is not true for children with autism, who exhibit significant deficits in ToM abilities (Astington & Baird, 2005).

It may also be difficult to discern ToM abilities in individuals who have little or no interest in social interactions, which is the case with many individuals with autism. Behaviors such as pretend play and imitation have been associated with the development of ToM. While it was previously thought that an individual either had or did not have ToM, ToM deficits may exist on a continuum: an individual may have deficits to some degree in some areas, while being capable in other areas.

Special types of brain cells called mirror neurons may be involved in ToM abilities. It has been found that the mirror neuron systems of children with autism differ from those of typically developing children, and are associated with deficits in imitation, ToM, and social communication (Dapretto et al., 2006).

See also:
  1. Lantz, J. (2002). Theory of mind in autism: Development, implication, and interventions. The Reporter, 7 (3), 18 – 25.
  2. Soraya, L. (2008, May 19). Empathy, mindblindness, and theory of mind: Do people with autism truly lack empathy? Psychology Today: Asperger’s Diary.
  3. Astington, J. W., & Baird, J.A. (2005). Why language matters for theory of mind. Cary, NC: Oxford University Press.
  4. Brüne, M., & Brüne-Corhs, U. (2006). Theory of mind — Evolution, ontogeny, brain mechanisms and psychopathology. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 30, 437 – 455.
  5. Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Distinguishing intentional from accidental actions in orangutans (Pongo pygmaues), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and human children (Homo sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 112, 192 – 206.
  6. Dapretto, M., Davies, M.S., Pfeifer, J.H., Scott, A.A., Sigman, M., Bookheimer, S.Y., et al. (2006). Understanding emotions in others: Mirror neuron dysfunction in children with autism spectrum disorders. Nature Neuroscience, 9, 28 – 30.
  7. Philips, M.L., Drevets, W.C., Rauch, S.L., & Lane, R. (2003). Neurobiology of emotion perception II: Implications for major psychiatric disorders. Biological Psychiatry, 54, 515 – 528.
  8. Premack, D.G., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 515 – 526.
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